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Reliable authentication of communicating entities is essential for achieving security in a distributed
computing environment. The design of such systems as Kerberos, SPX and more recently KryptoKnight
and Kuperee, have largely been successful in addressing the problem. The common element with these
implementations is the need for a trusted third-party authentication service. This essentially requires
a great deal of trust to be invested in the authentication server which adds a level of complexity and
reduces system lIexibility.
The use of a Beacon to promote trust between communicating parties was first suggested by M. Rabin
in "Transactions protected by beacons", joufllal I!f COlllputer alld Systelll Scieltces. Vol. 27. pp. 256267. 1983. In this paper we revive Rabin's ideas which have been largely overlooked in the past
decade. In particular we present a novel approach to the authentication problem based on a service
called Beacoll which continuously broadcasts certified nonces. We argue that this approach considerably
simplifies the solution to the authentication problem and we illustrate the impact of such a service by
"Beaconizing" the well know Needham and Schroeder protocol. The modified protocol would pe
suitable for deployment at upper layers of the communication stack. We also illustrate the wide range
of potential use of Beacons by employing it in a distributed authentication scheme based on the Kuperee
server.

Keywords: Beacon, authenticatiun. network security. information security. security protucol

1. Introduction

In the past thirty years the rapid evolution of electronic data communication has
been breath taking_ This growth and reliance on electronic communication has
increased concern about data privacy and integrity. Much effort is currently being
devoted to providing security services for a variety of communication environments. Authentication is universally acknowledged as being essential for secure
communications in a distributed system.
Informally, authentication is the capability of the recipient of a communication
to be able to verify that the message did corne from the alleged sender. As a
further requirement, it is usual to expect such systems to perform verification over
an open insecure network. This requirement constrains the authentication system
in the fOllowing manner:
- Reliance must not be placed in the physical security of all hosts m the distributed system.
0926-227X/96/$8.00 © 1996 - lOS Press. All rights reserved
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- lL should be assumed
modilied and inserted
- Trust cannot be based
- Trust cannot be based

that packets traveling along the network can be read.
with lillie effort by an adversary.
on the senders' address.
on the senders' operating system security.

Currently, the dominant authentication protocols employed in a client-server
environment use a broker to arbitrate between principals who wish to cOllllllunicate.
In such a scheme, a principal must first contact the broker to obtain credentials
which can be trusted by its communicating partner. The protocol will typically
rely on an exchange of cryptographic messages and the participant's knowledge of
some secret. Well known examples of such systems are Kerberos [2, 10,20], SPX
[21], KryptoKnight [I I] and Kuperee [9].
In this paper we present a novel approach to the authentication problem for
a distributed computer system using a public key cryptographic system and we
introduce a new service called Beacoll which has been inspired by Rabin [IS].
A Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, certified nonces which are accessible to
all hosts within the network. In Section 3 we give describe the approach taken in
this paper is described.
As a means of contrasting the Beacon based approach to authentication with thc
more established authentication protocols, in Section 4 we "beaconizc" the very
well known Needham and Schroeder public key protocol. We assume that the
reader is familiar with the basic philosophy of Needham and Schroeder. For a
complete description of the protocol we would direct the reader to [12].
In Section 5 we discuss the advantages of the beaconized approach. This is
followed in Section 6 by the use of Beacons for distributed authentication using
several Kuperee [9] servers. The paper finally closes in Section 7 with some
concluding remarks.

2. Conventions
Throughout this paper certain terms are used which may appear to be ambiguous
or new to readers. In the following section the use of these terms, in the context of
this document, are stated. This should avoid any difficulty caused by their being
used differently elsew~ere.
2.1. Termillology

A host is a computer with a unique address which is connected to a computer
network. The user is the human being who is using some services provided by
the network. All programs in the system are initiated by users. The main purpose
of authentication is to verify the identity of the users within a network. A client
is a program which runs on behalf of a user in order to request some service that
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is available on a remote host. Sinee the client runs on a user's behalf, it assumes
the user identity and privileges. Any action taken by a client is said to have been
carried out by the user. The server is a program which provides a service to a
client on the network. It is usually installed by the system administrator and runs
on behalf of the systelll. A server remains active in a network for much longer
than a client and thus is given an identity. Each server is therefore registered with
the system, in a similar manner to a user, and must prove its identity before a client
will accept it. Any cOllllllunicating network entity, that is client or server, can be
referred to as a principal. A reallll is organized in a hierarchical strudure and has
a strong analogy to domains in the Internet. A single authentication server, be it
a Beacon or Third-party Authenticator, is responsible for all local principals. This
collection of network entities, the authentication server and its clients, are referred
to as a rcalm. A client who wishes to obtain some service from a server within
the same realm would use the service to prove its identity.

2.2. Cryptographic requirements
The Beacon based system relies on a public key (or asymmetric) cryptographic
system. Many such systems have been designed and examples of such schemes can
be found in [18, 23]. For the purpose of our discussion the system's cryptographic
requirements can be simplilied and kept generic.
A public key system differs from a secret key (or symmetric) system in that
each principal in the distributed system has a pair of keys. The calculation of
this private and public key pair, given the initial conditions, is easy. However,
it would be infeasible for an adversary who knows a public key to calculate the
secret key or thc initial conditions. Each principal has a private key which is
kept secrct and is only known to that principal. The corresponding public kcy is
made available to all other principals. In the remainder of this paper "{} z" means
encipher with kcy Z. The private and public key pair will be denoted as "X" and
"Y", respectively, and subscripts will be used to identify. the associated principal.
Thus the Beacon would have a key pair XBN, YBN, the principal, Alice, would
have the pair X A , YA while Bob would have X B , Ys.
The advantage of a public key system is that it supports secrecy, authentication,
and integrity. Communication secrecy is supported by the transformations:

That is, suppose Alice wishes to send a secret message, M, to Bob. Then Alice
must have access to Bob's public kty and encipher the message, thus:

Alice sends Bob the cryptographic string C. On receipt Bob is able to employ
his private key to decipher the message.

{C}xB

= {{M}YB}xB = M.
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The encryption and decryption processes are easy using the appropriate keys.
However, it would be infeasible for an adversary to decipher C without the private
key X B , ensuring secrecy. Now, since YB is publicly known, Bob has no way of
being certain of the sender's identity. Thus authenticity has not been assureu using
this method.
Authentication, using a public key system, is satisljeu by the following transformation.

Alice is able to "sign" her message to Bob by using her private key, X A :

Bob is able to verify that the message could have only come from Alice by
deciphering the message using Alice's public key, YA , thus:

If the message is plain-text, Bob knows that C has in fact not been altereu.
However, if the message, or any portion of the message, is a random string then it
may be difficult for Bob to ascertain that the message has not been altered merely
by examining it. For this reason it is more usual for Alice to employ a suitable
one-way hashing function (e.g., [17, 22» to produce a Message Digest (M D).
Alice would sign the M D with her private key and append it to the message. On
receiving the message, Bob is able to reproduce the M D in order to confirm that
the message is from Alice and that it has not been altered. Finally, all three can
be employed by Alice to communicate securely with Bob thus:

3. Beacons
The use of a Beacon as a security service within a distributed computer system
was first suggested by M. Rabin [15]. Rabin's novel ideas on the use of Beacons
have been largely overlooked by the research community during the past decade.
We revive these ideas by' transferring them to the authentication problem. The following is a more detailed description of the concept, feasibility and implementation
of a Beacon.
A Beacon, within the context of this paper, is a service which is provided by a
secure host in a computer network. The Beacon broadcasts, at regular intervals, a
nonce encapsulated within a certified token. The emitted token would be accessible
to all hosts on the network and each host maintains a short list of fresh tokens.
The additional load caused by this service would be small as each host is only
required to listen for a short and relatively infrequent message.
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3.1. Tokell
The token has the following form:

N i , time, life, {MD}xBN'
where:
N.

time
life

AID
X BN

-+
-+
-+
-+
-+

is a freshly generateu nonce.
is the tillle at which the token was emilleu.
is the time after which the token will not be valiu.
is the message uigest.
is the Beacon's secret encryption key which is useu to certify the
token.

Each host which receives the token is able to verify its valiuity by uecrypting
the MD using the Beacon's public key. The MD ensures that the token has not
been tampered with. Since the token is signed with the Beacon's secret key it is
reasonable to assume the token originated from the Beacon. Each host is able to
maintain, on behalf of its principals, a short list of currently valid tokens. Thus
these tokens are available to all principals to use in the authentication process.

3.2. Network sYllchrollizatioll
There is reliance within a Beacon based system that each principal has access
to a stable clock and that these clocks are to some extent synchronized. Since the
life of a token can be relatively long, sayan hour, dilTerences of a few seconds
between the hosts can be tolerated. In this section we examine the Internet's
Network Time Protocol (NTP) to show that in fact it is feasible to have much
closer synchronization between communication hosts.
Any allempt to synchronize communicating entities requires access to an accurate standard. Since 1972 the time standard for the world has been based on
International Atomic Time which is currently maintained to an accuracy of a few
parts in 10 12 [1]. Many countries operate standard time and frequency broadcast
stations which collectively cover most areas of the world.
The network time protocol (NTP) is an Internet standard protocol [16] which
is used to maintain a network of time servers, accessible over normal Internet
paths. Even though transmission delays over Internet can vary widely, due to
Iluctuations in traffic loads and dynamic message routing, NTP acts to provide
global synchronization. NTP is built on Internet's User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
[14] which provides a connectionless transport mechanism.
The NTP system consists of a network of primary and an estimated total of
over 2000 secondary time servers. Primary time servers are directly synchronized
by reference source, usually a timecode receiver, or a calibrated atomic clock.
Secondary time servers are synchronized by either a primary server or another
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sccondary timc servers. Due to the wide dispersal of these scrvers, acccss IS
available using some thousands of routes over hundreds of networks, making the
system very reliable.
In a typical configuration used at the University of Illinois and the University of Delaware, the institutions operate three campus servers. These servers
are synchronized using two primary servers and each other. The three campus
servers in turn provide synchronization for department servers which then deliver
time to remaining hosts. In such a configuration, several hundred synchronization
milliseconds-seconds would not be uncommon.

3.3. Creating a Beacon
As stated above, a Beacon is a service which, at regular intervals, emits a token
which can be authenticated. The emitted token must be accessible to all hosts on
the network and each host is required to maintain a short list of fresh tokens. Since
the broadcast is short and relatively infrequent, implementation is quite feasible in
either software or hardware. Algorithm 1 shows the functionality.

Algorithm 1 BeacollO
l. t = clock + t::,.
2. Ni = GO
3. M Di = h(t, life, N.)
4. T = t,life, N .. {M D.} XUN
5. while (clock < t) wait
6. broadcast(T)
7. goto(l)
end

The algorithm begins by setting, t, the time for the next broadcast. Next, the
token is constructed prior to broadcasting (Steps 2 to 4). The cryptographically
strong pseudo-random generator, GO, is used to create a nonce N i . The final
component required to create the token is the message digest (M D). The one-way
hash function, h, is employed to compress the bit string created by the concatenation
of the broadcast time, t, the token life, l and the nonce N i . The output, which is of
a fixed length, is used as the MD. The token, T consists of the M D, M D i , signed
with the Beacon's private key and the other three fields. The token is broadcast at
time t (Steps 5 and 6). The algorithm is then repeated (Step 7).

3.4. Olle-time tokell
It is generally accepted that the beneficial features of a public key cryptosystem
are bought at the expense of speed. At present it is not feasible to use a public

;\. JilV(I et (I/. / Beacolls lor allthellticatioll ill distributed systellls

87

key system for bulk encryption. In practice, however, it is quite desirable to
create a hybrid system in which a public key system is used for authentication
and distribution of a session key. The session key would then be used by the two
principals to communicate securely using a symmetric key system.
With a Beacon based system, a "one-time token" can be used to simplify the
process. By one-time token it is meant that a token emitted by the Beacon can be
used only once to obtain service from a particular server; much like an admission
ticket to a theatre. Once the token has been presented, it is marked and will not
be accepted by that server on any subsequent occasion. The process of marking
tokens is much easier for the server than maintaining a database of prior requests.
The use of one-time tokens eliminates the possibility of a replay attack and thus
simplifies the process.
To illustrate the process consider a very simple case. Alice wishes to communrcate securely with Bob. In this case Bob can be thought of as being the server
and Alice the client. Assume, for simplicity, that Alice and Bob cOllllllunicated
yesterday and they are both certain that each knows the other's public key. Such
an occurrence is not uncommon in a distributed system since most principals communicate within a small group and a cache is commonly used to store commonly
used keys. The process has two steps:

I. Alice => Bob: Alice, N i , {I(A,B}YB' {M D} X A • Alice initiates the exchange
by sending Bob a message which contains her name, the nonce N i , and a
session key J(A,B. The session key is created by Alice, and will be used with
a symmetric cryptographic system to secure subsequent messages. Since the
session key is the secret in the message, it is the only part that is enciphered
with Bob's public key, YB. The nonce, N., is selected at random by Alice
from the list of active tokens and ensures message freshness. The message
integrity is protected using a !vI D which is signed by Alice.
2. Bob => Alice: {N;} KA.B. Bob, having received the request for communication, can confirm that the message did come from Alice and that it has
not been altered. The freshness of the message is guaranteed by the use of
a nonce, N i , which was recently broadcast by the Beacon. Since the nonce
can be used only once there is of course a finite probability that the nonce
chosen by the Alice from the active list has already been presented to Bob by
someone else. In such a case the request would be rejected and Alice would
have to re-apply with another nonce. The probability of such a collision occurring is dependent on factors such as network load, token frequency and
token life. In practical applications the additional load caused by this effect
should be minima!.
Having received a session key which he can trust, Bob completes the protocol
by authenticating himself to Alice. He enciphers the nonce with a session key and
sends it to Alice. Since only Bob could have obtained session key, the message
proves Bob's identity.
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4. Beaconizillg the Needham and Schroeder protocol
The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol [12) is arguably one of the best
known authentication and key distribution protocols. It has been the basis of a
number of systems which use the nonce to prove freshness. In 1981 Denning and
Sacco [5) pointed out a weakness in the NS protocol and suggested the use of timestamped certilicates to guard against a rcplay attack. Since that time authentication
protocols have been divided into two groups, one preferring the usc of nonces and
the other preferring time-stamps.
In this section we brielly outline the NS protocol using asymmetric keys. Next
we will describe the weakness pointed out by Denning and Sacco and their solution
to the problem. For a complete description the reader is directed to the original
papers (12) and [5). We will then modify the NS protocol to take advantage of
a Beacon. We will show that the modilied protocol simplilies the solution to the
authentication problem and has advantages over both the NS protocol and modilied
protocol suggested by Denning and Sacco.

4.1. Needham alld Schroeder protocol
The NS protocol requires a trusted authentication server (AS) to establish trust
between two principals wishing to communicate. Each principal within a realm
which is dominated by a particular AS, is required to register his or her public key
with that AS. To establish trust between principals, the AS must have the trust of
all principals within its realm, to maintain and distribute these keys reliably.
The NS protocol can be divided in to distinct sections. The following illustrates
the two protocol sections.

Public key distributioll protocol. Consider the situation where Alice wishes to
communicate with Bob but is not certain of his public key. Thus she must apply
to the AS to obtain Bob's public key. The steps required are as follows:
I. Alice =? AS: Alice, Bob. Alice sends a message to the AS requesting the
public key. The re.questing message is in clear text and is the names of both
principals.
2. AS =? Alice: {Bob, YB} XAS ' The AS responds with a message containing
the requested public key and is signed with the AS's private key. The message
contains the name of the key's owner which allows Alice to verify that the
reply contains the correct key.

This exchange does not by itself provide any assurance that the request was
initiated by Alice nor of the freshness of the AS's reply.
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CUllllectiull prulUcol. Assuming that both Alice and Bob are able to obtain any
required keys from the AS, the following are the steps required for them to authenticate each other in order to establish a conversation. Alice is the initiator.

I. Alice => Bob: {NA, Alice }YB • Alice is able initiate the authentication process
by sending Bob a message which contains a nonce, N A , and her identity. The
message is enciphered with Bob's public key, Y B , which means only Bob will
be able to access NA.
2. Bob => Alice: {NA' NfJ}YA' On receiving the message, Bob obtains the
nonce N A . However, Bob cannot be certain of freshness nor of the identity
of the aetual sender. To verify identity and guard against a replay allack, Bob
generates a nonce, N B, and sends it to Alice. Bob also proves his identity to
Alice by including N A in the reply. The message to Alice is encrypted with
Alice's public key.
3. Alice => Bob: {NH} YB' As a linal step in this authentication process, Alice
proves her identity to Bob by returning N B.

4.2. Dellllillg alld Saccu j. modificatiull
In [5] Denning and Sacco analyzed the protocol and pointed out that it is only
secure while there has not been a key compromise. The solution suggested by
Denning and Sacco uses time stamped certilicates. The form of these certilicates
is as follows:

where:
p
Yp

T
XAS

-+
-+
-+
-+

is
is
is
is

the
the
the
the

principal's identilication.
public key belonging to principal P.
time at which the certilicate was i~sued.
AS's private key which is used to sign the certificate.

The Denning and Sacco modilied protocol combines the authentication and key
distribution into a single process. That is, if the principals are able to obtain public
keys reliably and message freshness can be guaranteed, then the communicating
principals are able to use the features of their public key cryptographic system to
authenticate messages. The steps of the modified protocol are as follows:
I. Alice => AS: Alice, Bob. As before, Alice sends a request for two certificates,
one containing Bob's public key and the other containing Alice's public key.
2. AS => Alice: C A , CB. The AS responds with a message containing two
signed certificates. C A contains Alice's public key and C B contains Bob's.
3. Alice => Bob: C A , CB. Alice initiates the conversation with Bob by sending
the certilicates. Since the certificates are signed by the AS and contain a
time-stamp to prove freshness, Bob is able to trust them.
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In [5] Denning and Sacco point out that in order for Alice to obtain the certificates
and deliver them to Bob, the certificates must have a lifetime. By this it is meant
that the certificates must be valid for a duration of time. The length of the certificate
lifetime would depend on factors such as the synchronization discrepancy between
hosts and communication delays. During this period the protocol is vulnerable to
a replay allack. Thus if the certificate lifetime is kept short, the protocol reduces
the likelihood of a replay allack, but does not eliminate it.
Another feature of the modified protocol is that principals are no longer able to
cache commonly used keys. Since the certificate lifetime must be kept short to
minimize the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate all conversations.

4.3. A Beacoll based applVacll
We now introduce a Beacon to the distributed system and modify the NS protocol
to take advantage of the new service. As in the unlllodified NS protocol, the
beaconized protocol can be divided into two sections. The /irst enables a principal
to obtain another's public key. The second, the connection protocol, is used by a
principal to initiate a conversation. We end this section by modifying the conncction
protocol to include the distribution of a symmetric session key. Once again we
will use the over worked principals, Alice and Bob, to demonstrate the protocol
features.

Public key distribution protocol.
to obtain Bob's public key.

The following are the steps required for Alice

=> AS: Alice, Bob. Alice sends a message to the AS stating her name
is Alice and requesting Bob's public key. The message is in plain-text and
only contains the two identities.
2. AS => Alice: Bob, YB, N i , {M D} XAS. Since the reply to Alice contains 110
secret information, the message is not enciphered. As in the NS protocol the
message contains the requested public key and the name of the key's owner.
This ensures that the request made by Alice has not been altered. The nonce,
N i , is picked randomly by the Beacon from the list of active tokens and is
used to guarantee that this message is not a replay. The message integrity is
ensured by the M D which is signed by the AS.
I. Alice

Since the Beacon based system uses the concept of a "one-time token", if Ni
has previously been presented to Alice, then it would have been marked and consequently the AS's reply would be rejected. In such circumstances, Alice would
have to reinitated the request. The probability of such a collision occurring, in a
practical application, is quite low.
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Connection protocol. Assuming that both Alil:e and Bob are able to obtain the
required keys, the following is the step required for Alice to initiate a wnversation.
I. Alil:e => Bob: Alice, N j , {M D} X A • Alice initiates the exchange by sending
Bob a message which I:ontains her name and the nonl:e, Nj. The nonl:e is
selected at random by Alil:e from the list of adive tokens and is used to
ensures message freshness. The message integrity is protel:ted using a AI D
which is signed by Alil:e. Since the message I:ontains no sel:ret information
it is not encrypted with Bob's publil: key.
If N j has previously been presented to Bob, then it would have been marked
and the request for connel:tion would be rejel:ted. In such an event Bob would
reply with an error message and Alil:e would selel:t another nonce and reinitiate
the request.

LJistribwion of a symmetric key.

At present it is not feasible to usc a publil: key
system for bulk encryption. Thus, it is quite desirable to I:reate a hybrid system in
whidl a public key system is used for authentil:ation and distribution of a session
key. The session key would then be used by the two principals to I:ollllllunil:atl:
sel:Urely using a symmetril: key system. We now modify the protowl to allow the
two principals, Alil:e and Bob, to share a session key.

1. Alil:e => Bob: Alice,Nk,{1{A,LJhu, {MD}x A • Alice would initiate such
an exchange by sending Bob a message containing her name, the nonce N k ,
and the session key, KA,B. Once again Nk is used to ensure freshness. SilKe
the session key is the only secret in the message, it is the only part that is
enciphered with Bob's public key, YB. The message integrity is protcl:ted
using a M D which is signcd by Alil:e.

4.4. Attacks on the modified protocol
The allal:ks that I:an be bundled against the beal:onizql protocol I:an be broken
up in to six categories. In the following sel:tion the effects of these are discussed
in turn.
- In a masquerade allack, an adversary attempts to impersonate one of the
principals in the system. Since the principal's secret key is used to prove its
identity, for such an attack to succeed an adversary would require knowledge
of such a key. If a principal's secret key were to be compromised, it is possible
that an adversary could masquerade as that principal while the problem was
undetected and before a new key was distributed. However, unlike the case of
the NS protocol, an adversary is unable to blol:k the distribution of new keys.
- By eavesdropping (or monitoring) network traffic, an adversary hopes to gain
some advantage or learn some secret. Sinl:e the public key protocol docs
not require the transmission of any secret information, such an attack cannot
sUl:ceed. In the case of the hybrid system, the session key is enciphered. Thus
an adversary would require knowledge of the del:iphering key.
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- The goal of a replay attack is to gain some advantage or secret knowledge
by retransmitting a message which was intercepted earlier. There are three
distinct areas in which a replay attack could be attempted. They are:
I. The token transmitted by the Beacon. The purpose of this message is to
broadcast a unique token to all hosts on the network. Since the token has
a linite life, if an expired token were retransmitted, the message would
simply be discarded. Replaying the message before the token expires gains
no advantage for the adversary as the duplicate token would be detected
and thus discarded.
2. The second attempt could be made against the public key distribution portion of the protocol. The protocol consists of two message. The effect or
replaying these would be:
The protocol is initiated by a principal request another principal's public
key. The request is in plain-text and is directed to the AS. Since the
information is public and service is freely available, the adversary can
gain nothing new.
- The reply from the AS contains the requested public key. Since the
message is unique; in that it contains the name of the recipient, a onetime nonce and is signed by the sender, a replayed message would be
detected.
3. The linal message that could be replayed is the request for connection. This
message is also unique, thus a replayed message would be detected and the
attack would fail.
- A modification attack is an attempt to change the contents of packets as they
travel across the computer network. For such an attack to succeed the change
must be undetected. Such an attack would be futile because the recipient or a
message is always able to detect any changes.
- An attempt to delay authentication messages would cause the token to expire
and prevent the principal from completing the authentication process. Such
an attack would have the same results as "denial of service".
- A denial of service attack could be launched by an adversary who is able to
hinder communications in some manner. Detection and countering of such an
attack is best deal\ with by other means, such as statistical monitoring of the
network.

4.5. Other applications: distributed authelltication in Kuperee
The concept of a Beacon as a continuous source of nonces can be extended
to accommodate various authentication requirements in distributed systems. One
possible application is in the context of distributed authentication using the Kuperee
server [9].
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In the past single-server solutions have become widely acceptcd. However, two
of the more important problems concerns the availability and performance of the
server and the security of the server itself [8]. First, since entities in the distributed system rely on the server for their authentication operations, the server
easily becomes a source of contention or bottleneck. The temporary unavailability
of the server can lead to a degradation in the overall performance of the distributed
system. Secondly, the fact that the server may hold cryptographic (secret) kcys
belonging to entities in the distributed system makes it the best point of attack for
intruders wishing to compromise the distributed system. An attacker that successfully compromises the server has access to the (secret) kcys of the entities under
the server's jurisdiction. The attacker can then carry-out various active and passive
attacks on the unsuspecting entities.
The approach of Kuperee is similar to that of the Kerberos authentication system [10, 20 J which is based on the Needham-Schroeder protocol [12, 13 j and
which uses a symmetric (private-key) cryptosystem. However, unlike Kerberos,
Kuperee employs an asymmetric (public-key) cryptosystem [23 j which provides it
with a number of different features to Kerberos (see [YD.
The use of a Beacon in the context of Kuperee is not limited to that of being a
source of nonces. In addition to broadcasting nonces, the Beacon also broadcasts
sOllie parameters which is used to establish distributed authentication over n Kuperee servers 5"52 , ... ,5,,. The distributed authentication via multiple servers
provides access to services for the clients based on a practical threshold [4, IYj (or
"secret sharing") scheme. The use of a threshold scheme among a collection of
security servers necessitates a client to consult a minimum of t out of n (t ( n)
honest servers before the authentication process succeeds or services are granted.
Here, the token transmitted by the Beacon also carries a "serial number" which is
used by a client to claim from these servers pieces of the secret needed for the
authentication process. Some preliminary work on distributed authentication in
Kuperee has been reported in [9].

5. Discussion on advantages
At present there are two dominant approaches to guaranteeing message freshness
within authentication schemes; the method favored by Needham and Schroeder requires that principals generate and exchange nonces. The second method which has
been suggested by Denning and Sacco makes use of a timestamp within certificates
that are fabricated by the authentication server. In this section we discuss the five
main advantages gained by the use of a beaconized approach. We will compare
our approach with these well known protocols.
- The Needham and Schroeder (NS) protocol has been thc basis for a number of
systems. The approach taken by them requires principals, wishing to establish
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a conversation, to engage in a three step message exchange. The purposc o/"
this exchange is to ascertain the identity of the other principal and to guard
against a replay attack. The distribution of public keys is provided by a trusted
authentication server, AS. In the worst case, where bOlh principals require the
services of the AS to obtain public keys, the protocol requires a total o/" seven
messages to be exchanged.
In Denning ;lnd Sacco's modified protocol (DS) principals arc rcquin:d 10
obtain certificates from the authentication server. One bendit o/" this approach
is that the number of messages required to initiate a conversation is reduced
to three.
The beaconized protocol allows principals with cached keys to initiate a conversion with a single message. The procedure for a principal to acquire the
public key of a communicating partner requires two steps.
- In [5J, Denning and Sacco pointed out that the NS protocol is vulnerable to
a replay attack in the event that a principal's key is compromised. To over
come this difficulty, they suggested the use of time-stamped certilicales. The
resulting protocol requires a principal who wishes to initiate a conversation, to
contact the AS to obtain two certificates; one for each principal. Each certilicate has a finite life and contains a public key. During the period between the
certificate being issued and expiring, the DS protocol is also is vulnerable to a
replay attack. Kerberos [2, 10, 20 J is the best known implementation o/" timestamp certificates and uses the symmetric key version of the DS protocol [5 j.
In practice the duration of an authenticator within Kerberos is typically live
minutes [3]. The DS protocol docs not eliminate the possibility o/" a replay
attack, but reduces it.
The beaconize protocol's use of one-time token eliminates the possibility of a
replay attack without the increased steps that arc suggested within the NS protocol.
- Another feature of the DS protocol is that principals are no longer able to
cache commonly used keys. The beaconized approach, like the NS protocol,
alIows principals to cache commonly used keys which results in the reduction
of network traffic and load on the authentication server.
- Within the DS protocol the certificate lifetime must be kept short to minimize
the risk of a replay attack, the AS must initiate most (if not all) attempts to
communicate. Con'sequentiy, a greater amount of trust is invested in the AS
and the realm now has a single point of failure.
The beaconized approach reduces the role of the AS to simply being a distributor
of p'lblic keys which was suggested in the original NS protocol.
- In response to the criticism made in [5] Needham and Schroeder suggested a
modification to their original protocol [13]. The revised NS protocol guards
against the redistribution of a compromised key by requiring the principals to
include a nonce in their communications with the authentication server. The

A. JiWll el al. / Beacolls .lor autllelllicalimJ ill disln/Juted s),slems

')5

purpose of this nonce is to reassure each principal that the message received
from the authentication server is fresh. This revision adds a small amount of
load to principals engaged in initiating a conversation.
In contrast the beaconized approach does not require each principal to have the
ability to generate nonces. It would be fair to say that this advantage is offset
within the overall system by the additional load caused by the introduction
of a Ikacon. However, within a practical environllIent there are likely to he
principals of varying abilities and it would be preferable if the generation of
good quality nonces was provided by a single service.

6. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have attempted to revive Rabin's ideas regarding Beacons and
have shown that the use of Beacons can simplify authentication in a distributed
system.
The fundamental difference between our approach and that more traditionally
taken is the use of a Beacon to deliver a "one-time token" to each host. This
simplifies the authentication process by taking advantage of the features of a public
key cryptographic system. In contrast to the modification proposed by Denning
and Sacco, the beaconized approach eliminates the possibility of a replay attack,
allows principals to cache commonly used keys and preserves the role of the AS
as a distributor of public keys.
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